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The significant rise in foreign bank claims observed during the 1990s, following
their steep decline during the 1980s debt crisis, reignited interest in understand-
ing the behavior of these flows. This paper analyzes changes in foreign bank
claims on the Latin American private sector over the period 1985–2000. We find
that banks transmit shocks from their home countries (where banks’headquarters
are located) and that changes in claims on individual host countries (those that
receive claims) are correlated with aggregate changes in claims on other coun-
tries. However, over time, we observe that foreign bank claims have become less
responsive to external factors. Also, we present evidence that the sensitivity of for-
eign bank claims to host factors diminishes, as banks’ aggregate exposure rises.
Finally, we find that foreign bank claims react more to positive than to negative
host shocks and are not significantly curtailed during crises. [JEL G21, N26]
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T
he 1990s saw a significant increase in foreign bank claims on developing coun-
tries. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), between 1985
and 2000, international banks’ total claims on developing countries increased
steadily from US$545.2 billion in 1985 to US$1,318.8 billion in 2000.1,2 By the
end of the 1990s, total claims of BIS-reporting banks (internationally active banks
that report data to the BIS on their overseas claims) on developing countries rep-
resented 31 percent of total local credit in the developing world.3Among countries
in Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe, foreign bank claims exceeded
50 percent of local credit.
Total claims of BIS-reporting banks on developing countries include cross-
border claims extended from outside the host countries, along with local claims
booked with the bank branches or subsidiaries operating in the host countries.4
Claims refer primarily to loans and advances but also include holdings of securities
and equity participations.
Following the steep decline in foreign bank claims during the 1980s debt cri-
sis, the rapid increase observed during the 1990s fueled a growing interest in the
behavior of these claims, and so emerged a new literature on multinational bank-
ing.5 Because part of the 1990s increase in foreign bank claims went hand in hand
with the establishment of foreign bank branches and subsidiaries in developing
countries, most existing studies focus on the performance of foreign bank operations
in these countries and analyze the impact of foreign bank entry on the efficiency and
profitability of domestic banks in developing countries (see Barajas, Steiner, and
Salazar, 2000; Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2001; Denizer, 2000;
Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg, 2001; and Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2004).
On the other hand, the question of what drives changes in foreign bank claims
has received less attention. There are, however, some insightful studies on this
issue. Goldberg (2002) examines the determinants of U.S. bank claims abroad and
finds that while U.S. economic conditions affect U.S. bank claims abroad, such
claims are less affected by economic conditions, including crises, in the host coun-
tries. Looking specifically at crises periods, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003)
1Throughout this period international bank claims refer to those from banks headquartered in Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
2This implies a 51 percent increase in real terms.
3Here, total local credit refers to credit provided by all banks (both foreign and domestic) with offices
in the developing world. Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
4“Host country” denotes the country to which a foreign bank extends claims either cross-border or
through its branches and/or subsidiaries in that country. “Home country” refers to the country of origin of
the foreign bank, that is, the country where the bank’s headquarters are located.
5Previously, the literature on multinational banking focused primarily on the experience of developed
countries (especially the United States) with foreign bank entry and on the internationalization of the activ-
ities of banks from these countries during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Goldberg and Saunders
(1981a and b); Cho, Krishnan, and Nigh (1987); and Goldberg and Grosse (1994) investigate the factors
driving the extent and type of foreign bank presence in the United States, while Fisher and Molyneux
(1996) conduct a similar study of foreign bank activities in London. On the other hand, papers such as
Goldberg and Saunders (1980); Nigh, Cho, and Krishnan (1986); Goldberg and Johnson (1990); and Buch
(2000) examine the operations of German (in the case of the last paper) and U.S. banks abroad.Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Andrew Powell, and Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar
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investigate the role of international banks in transmitting crises and find evidence
that in certain episodes, changes in banks’exposure to crises countries help predict
bank flows in other countries. However, their data capture primarily cross-border
claims.6 On the other hand, taking into account foreign bank local claims to devel-
oping countries, Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000); Peek and Rosengren (2000);
Goldberg (2002); and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2003) provide evidence that for-
eign bank claims did not retrench during recent crises in Latin America and Central
and Eastern Europe.
Using a comprehensive data set on foreign bank claims to the private sector in
Latin America for the period 1985–2000, we revisit some of the issues examined
by previous papers on the determinants of foreign bank claims. More importantly,
we explore new questions associated with this issue. The purpose of this study is
not to compare the behavior of foreign and domestic banks, but rather to understand
what drives changes in foreign bank claims to developing countries and how for-
eign banks respond to different types of shocks, under various circumstances.
These are important issues both for countries already relying heavily on foreign
bank financing and for those countries considering a greater role for foreign banks.
Like other papers that have examined the behavior of foreign bank claims, we
analyze their reaction to home and host conditions, and, in particular, we investi-
gate whether foreign banks retrench during host crises. One contribution of our
paper vis-à-vis others that have looked at these issues is that we consider the behav-
ior of foreign claims for a larger combination of home and host countries, over a
longer period of time, including both tranquil and crisis episodes.
Furthermore, we extend the analysis on the determinants of foreign bank
claims in some new directions. First, we examine whether the sensitivity of foreign
banks to external and host shocks is the same across banks from different home
countries. Second, we investigate whether foreign banks respond similarly to posi-
tive and negative shocks. Third, we analyze whether foreign bank behavior and the
impact of different types of shocks changed over time. Finally, we study how for-
eign bank claims are affected by factors previously overlooked in the literature. In
particular, we evaluate how the level of foreign banks’ exposure affects their
responsiveness to host country shocks and whether aggregate movements in claims
to other countries drive changes in foreign bank claims to individual hosts.
Our analysis focuses on Latin America for at least three reasons. First, foreign
banks have had an active presence in the region for an extended period. Second,
while for the region as a whole foreign bank claims increased over our period of
study, there are still significant differences in the importance of this source of funds
across countries in Latin America.7 Finally, most countries in the region have been
6Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) examine a panel of BIS data on flows to 30 emerging markets dis-
aggregated by 11 banking centers, to test the role of bank claims in transmitting currency crises. They find
that changes in bank exposures to a crisis country helped predict bank flows in third countries after the
Asian crisis, but to a lesser extent during the Mexican 1994 crisis.
7For example, international bank claims (cross-border claims and local claims in foreign currency) in
2000 represented more than 55 percent of domestic credit for Argentina and Peru, but they accounted for
only 19 percent of domestic credit for Brazil.subject to pronounced economic cycles and several crises, providing us with a
unique opportunity to analyze the impact of these factors on foreign bank claims.
We consider the 1985–2000 period an interesting one to study because during
this time frame foreign financing grew significantly across Latin America and the
developing world, in general. Furthermore, over this period, many developing
countries, and certainly most in the Latin American region, liberalized their finan-
cial systems, allowing foreign banks to play a greater role in their local financial
sectors. As a result, during this period, the nature of foreign bank financing changed
considerably from almost purely cross-border to a mix that also included local
lending through foreign bank branches and subsidiaries in the host countries.
Our empirical estimations allow us to corroborate, for a larger combination of
home and host countries and over a relatively long period, many of the results found
by previous studies. In particular, like Goldberg (2002), we find that home country
conditions drive changes in foreign bank lending. Also, controlling for host growth
and credit ratings, we find that foreign bank claims do not retrench significantly
during crises in the host countries (as found by Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney, 2000;
Peek and Rosengren, 2000; and Goldberg, 2002).
More importantly, our work yields interesting new results. First, while foreign
banks from different home countries appear to react similarly to host country
shocks, their reaction to shocks from their own countries seems to vary by home
country. Second, claims on individual host countries are positively associated with
aggregate changes in claims to other countries. However, foreign banks’reaction to
external shocks (with respect to the host) has diminished over time. Third, foreign
banks also respond to host country shocks. However, the higher the aggregate
exposure of foreign banks to a given host country, the lower the sensitivity of
claims to host country shocks. In other words, foreign bank claims become less
procyclical as exposure rises. Finally, we uncover asymmetries regarding foreign
banks’ response to positive and negative shocks, given that banks appear to react
more to the former than to the latter.
I. The Data on Foreign Bank Claims to Latin America
Our data on foreign bank claims to Latin America come from the BIS.8 Specifically,
the data we obtained are international financial claims on the nonbank private sec-
tor as reported in the BIS’s Consolidated Banking Statistics.9 These country-level
statistics sum the claims extended by the headquarters of foreign banks or by their
offices outside the host countries (that is, cross-border claims) with the foreign cur-
rency claims provided by the affiliates (that is, branches and subsidiaries) of for-
eign banks in the host countries. Therefore, in our analysis, foreign bank claims
refer to international financial claims to the nonbank private sector as defined by
8For a full description of these data see BIS (2003).
9The BIS distinguishes among international financial claims directed to the private, public, and bank-
ing sectors. Claims on the latter include those on the central bank and on public and private financial insti-
tutions. As a result, we study the behavior of claims on the nonbank private sector only.
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the BIS.10 However, the BIS does not typically publish the disaggregation by sec-
tor (public, private, or banking) and by country of origin at the same time, so these
data are confidential and were provided by the BIS with the authorization of each
of the home/lender country’s central banks.
We specifically focus on the behavior of claims from banks headquartered in
seven industrialized countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) on the private sector in 10 Latin American coun-
tries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela) over the period 1985–2000.11 Our choice of home and
host countries is driven by their relative importance as lenders and borrowers to and
from the Latin American region, respectively. Banks from the seven home countries
account for more than 80 percent of all foreign bank claims to Latin America. In
turn, the 10 host countries in our sample receive more than 95 percent of all foreign
bank claims to the region.
Our period of analysis was determined by several factors. From a conceptual
standpoint, we wanted to look at the behavior of foreign bank claims during a
period characterized by greater financial liberalization in the region and by an
observed preference by international banks to increase their operations in develop-
ing countries. From a practical standpoint, we are unable to look at the period pre-
1985, because the BIS started gathering information on foreign bank claims in that
year. Also, our analysis ends in 2000 because extending the sample would be
worthwhile if we could analyze the case of the 2001 Argentine crisis. However,
because during this episode the Argentine government forced the conversion of all
foreign currency claims into pesos, we cannot disentangle from the BIS data the
impact of the pesification from a true cancellation of claims on the part of foreign
banks. As a result, we stop our analysis in the year 2000.
Rather than examine the behavior of total—both public and private—foreign
bank claims, we focus on private sector claims exclusively, for several reasons.
First, in recent years, foreign bank claims on the private sector have come to rep-
resent the bulk of foreign bank claims to developing countries and, in particular,
to Latin American economies.12 Second, foreign bank claims on the public sector
may reflect the heterogeneous and particular fiscal policies of different govern-
ments. Also, changes in public sector claims may not be driven by the voluntary
profit-maximizing choices of foreign banks but rather may be affected by political
10Our definition of foreign bank claims ignores the local claims in local currencies extended by for-
eign banks. The BIS does not report data on these statistics with a sectoral breakdown (that is, there is no
discrimination between claims held with the private and public sectors). Nevertheless, we feel that the def-
inition of claims used here, which focuses on foreign currency claims, might be more representative of the
actual exposure or potential losses that foreign banks could face from their operations in developing coun-
tries, since in general it will be harder for countries to repay claims in foreign currency, especially if some
of those claims go to individuals or firms that do not receive dollar incomes.
11Though the BIS statistics are biannual until 2000 and quarterly thereafter, data availability for the
remaining variables in our empirical model leads us to focus on annual, end-of-year changes.
12By the end of 2000, claims to the nonbank private sector represented 53 percent of all claims to
developing countries and 62 percent of all claims to Latin American countries, with the remaining claims
evenly split between the public and banking sectors in those countries.considerations and/or moral suasion on the part of governments.13 Finally, claims
on the public sector are more likely to take the form of bonds, and public bond
markets are more liquid than those for private sector debt. As a consequence, end-
of-period valuations of foreign bank claims might not be representative of foreign
banks’ exposure over a given period.14
Figures 1 through 4 illustrate the behavior of foreign bank claims to the non-
bank private sector in Latin America from 1985 to 2000. In the early to mid-1980s,
claims to Latin America accounted for more than one-third of the claims extended
by banks from the seven BIS-reporting countries on non-BIS-reporting countries
(see Figure 1). Over the second half of the 1980s, foreign banks diversified away
from the region, and claims to the 10 selected Latin American economies in the
region declined in real terms between 1985 and 1990 (see Figure 2). However, over
the 1990s, real claims rebounded, rising rapidly and surpassing the US$100 billion
mark by the end of the decade. Thus, exposure to Latin America remained below
13An example is the recent crisis in Argentina, where domestic and foreign banks were coerced into
increasing their exposure to the public sector through debt swaps.
14Also, derivative markets on public sector bonds are reasonably liquid, and the BIS data may not con-
trol well for such operations. While the same objections may be raised with respect to claims on the pri-
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data.
1The seven selected BIS-reporting home contries are Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Latin America here refers to the 10 largest countries in the region: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.   
Figure 1. The Exposure of Banks from Selected BIS-Reporting Countries 
to the Private Sector in Latin America1
(Claims on Latin America from all banks 
as percent of these banks’ total private sector claims)
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1980s levels but rose steadily over time, reaching 17 percent of all claims (to devel-
oping and developed non-BIS-reporting countries) in 2000.15
U.S., French, German, and, recently, Spanish banks were the most important
sources of bank financing to the region throughout the sample (see Figure 3). U.S.
banks almost always held the most claims on the region, accounting for more than
20 percent of all claims to the nonbank private sector throughout the entire period
1985–2000. The exception is France in 1990, when French banks accounted for
more than 35 percent of all claims to Latin America. However, French claims to the
region have dropped, reaching less than 15 percent of all claims to Latin America
in the year 2000. German bank claims on Latin America hovered between 15 and
20 percent of all claims to this region. In the mid-1990s, Spain emerged as the
country with the fastest-growing share of claims to the region, accounting for less
than 5 percent of claims in 1985 but exceeding 20 percent of total claims to the non-
bank private sector in Latin America by 2000.
At the same time, throughout this period, Spanish and U.S. banks had the high-
est exposure to this region (see Figure 4). Spanish banks’exposure averaged 50 per-
cent of all their total international private claims on non-BIS-reporting countries,
while for the United States this figure was 35 percent. However, the trend in exposure








































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data.
1 The seven selected BIS-reporting home countries are Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Latin America here refers to the 10 largest countries in the region: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.   
Figure 2. The Evolution of Claims from Banks 
from Selected BIS-Reporting Countries on the Latin American Private Sector1
(In billions of constant U.S. dollars)across these two countries is very different. While U.S. exposure remained fairly con-
stant throughout the period 1985–2000, Spanish banks’ exposure increased signifi-
cantly from less than 40 percent in the early 1990s to more than 68 percent by 2000.
II. Empirical Methodology
Our general econometric model explaining changes in foreign bank claims is rep-
resented by equation (1) below, where j = 1 to 7 identifies the seven BIS home
countries, i = 1 to 10 indicates each individual Latin American host country, and 
t = 1985 to 2000 refers to the time period considered.16 Equation (1) includes both




1i,r espectively, and allows the
coefficients to vary depending on the home country (this explains the j superscript
on all coefficients).17 However, since it is possible that banks from different home
countries react similarly to host and even home country shocks, we test different
16The United Kingdom is the exception, where data on private sector claims are available only for the
period 1993–2000.
17Alternatively, we could estimate a separate regression for each home (lender) country, using
Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), to account for the contemporaneous cross-equation
correlation in the error terms. As a robustness check, we estimated separate equations for each lender and
compared those results with the results from estimating equation (1). The differences are not significant,
and, furthermore, the drawback of the SUR method is that it forces our data into a balanced panel, signif-
















Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data.
1The seven selected BIS-reporting home countries are Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Latin America here refers to the 10 largest countries in the region: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.   
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Figure 3. The Importance of Selected BIS-Reporting Countries’ Bank Claims
for the Latin American Private Sector1
(Percent of total selected BIS-reporting countries’ claims 
on Latin America’s private sector)Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Andrew Powell, and Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar
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restricted versions of equation (1) to arrive at the baseline specification that we
report in the results section.
The dependent variable, %∆Claimsj,i,t,, is the annual percentage change in real
consolidated international claims from banks in home country j to the nonbank pri-
vate sector in host country i between t − 1 and t.18The empirical model implemented
to analyze the behavior of this variable draws on existing studies on foreign bank
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18Note that while an increase in claims reflects a rise in foreign bank’s exposure, it is not necessarily
associated solely with new lending to the region. For example, the acquisition of a domestic bank by a for-
eign bank will lead to a rise in claims (as the loan portfolio of the domestic bank is absorbed by the foreign
bank), but it may or may not lead to new lending, depending on the actions of the foreign bank following
the acquisition. Nevertheless, based on some rough calculations using the BIS Locational Statistics, we can
estimate that more than 70 percent of the international claims to Latin America are in the form of loans.
















Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data.
1The seven selected BIS-reporting home countries are Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Latin America here refers to the 10 largest countries in the region: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.   
Figure 4. The Exposure of Selected BIS-Reporting Countries’ Banks 
to Latin America’s Private Sector1
(Claims to Latin America as a percentage of each country’s 
total international private sector claims)claims (especially Goldberg, 2002) and on the extensive literature on capital
flows.19 These studies estimate reduced-form models that take into account the
role of both home or push and host or pull factors. Home or push factors are con-
sidered to be exogenous to the host country and refer to structural or cyclical fea-
tures of the home countries, which affect banks’ desire to invest abroad. Home
country interest rates and growth rates have been commonly used to proxy for the
role of push factors (see, for example, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1993;
Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi, 1998; Goldberg, 2002; and Hernandez, Mellado,
and Valdes, 2001). On the other hand, pull factors refer to host country characteris-
tics that affect the risk-return trade-off of investing in these countries. Country
credit ratings and host growth rates are among the most frequently used pull factors
(see Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi, 1998; Goldberg, 2002; and Hernandez,
Mellado, and Valdes, 2001).
Following the literature discussed above, to account for host factors, we
include the real GDP growth, the change in country risk rating, and a dummy cap-
turing crisis episodes in each of the Latin American host countries. As home fac-
tors, we include the real GDP growth and real interest for each of the seven home
countries.20 Growth and interest rate figures come from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS), published by the International Monetary Fund. The credit ratings
used are those reported by Institutional Investor magazine.21,22 This rating takes
values between 0 to 100, with higher numbers representing a better repayment
capacity on the part of the host country. The crisis dummy variable equals 1 during
banking, currency, or twin crisis periods. A chronology of crises in the region was
obtained from Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Bordo and others (2001).23
Aside from the impact of push and pull factors on foreign bank claims to each
host, we also take into account the role of exposure to each host and the potential
influence of movements in foreign claims to other countries. To test the impact of
exposure on how foreign banks react to host country shocks, we interact variables
capturing host factors with an aggregate measure of banks’exposure. Exposure is
the ratio of home country j’s bank claims on the private sector of host country i to
the total private sector claims extended by country j’s banks worldwide. This ratio
is calculated from the BIS’s Consolidated Banking Statistics.
19See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993); Fernandez-Arias (1996); Chuhan, Claessens, and
Mamingi (1998); and Hernandez, Mellado, and Valdes (2001).
20For example, in modeling the behavior of Canadian claims to Latin America, we allow for Canadian
GDP and interest rates to affect changes in these claims, but economic conditions from other home coun-
tries are not assumed to enter the regression for Canadian claims.
21Institutional Investor magazine publishes a semiannual survey of country credit ratings. The maga-
zine surveys bankers, money managers, and economists around the world on their evaluations of the rela-
tive risk of countries to which they lend. On the basis of their responses, the magazine produces a rating
from 0 to 100, with higher numbers representing a better repayment capacity. We use end-of-year ratings.
22In alternative specifications that are not shown but are available upon request, we replaced the credit
risk rating for a number of macro variables (government deficit, current account deficit, and real exchange
rate appreciation, among others) that serve as proxies for country risk. Given that results were very simi-
lar, we prefer this more parsimonious specification, which allows us to examine interaction effects and
positive and negative shocks more easily.
23See Table A.1 for a list of crises in each host country in the period 1985–2000.
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To examine whether movements in claims to other countries spill over to indi-
vidual hosts, we include as an explanatory variable the aggregate changes in claims
from home country banks to all non-BIS-reporting countries other than that indi-
vidual host (%∆ Private Claims on Other Countries). This variable is also con-
structed from the BIS’s Consolidated Banking Statistics.
Finally, because foreign bank claims are reported in U.S. dollars, we also con-
trol for changes in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar for each country.24
Exchange rate data also come from the IFS. Table 1 summarizes the definition and
sources of all the variables included in equation (1).
Foreign banks are less likely to extend claims abroad if the riskiness or the
returns obtained from the host countries worsen. Lower host growth or rating
downgrades should then lead to a decline in claims to the affected host country.
Hence, we expect to find a positive coefficient on the growth and rating variables,
consistent with what the literature on capital flows has found.25
A priori, we might expect banking, currency, and/or twin crisis episodes in a
particular host country to be accompanied by a decline in foreign bank claims,
since these episodes are typically associated with a fall in the capacity of crises-
stricken countries to repay their obligations. On the other hand, foreign banks
might view crises in host countries as an opportunity to expand their operations and
increase their market share locally.26 Also, crises might coincide with a deteriora-
tion in economic fundamentals such as GDP growth, making their impact indistin-
guishable from that of other cyclical downturns. In other words, it is possible that
the crisis dummy in our regressions may not be significant because the impact of
these episodes is being captured by changes in host GDP growth. This, in turn,
would suggest that crises are not perceived as different from any other cyclical
downturn in output.
In principle, given the overall importance of foreign claims to the region,
changes in such claims could affect host countries’ right-hand-side variables (for
example, host real GDP growth, timing of crises, and credit rating), implying a
potential endogeneity problem. However, we believe that the scope for this is lim-
ited, since our estimations focus on bilateral claims (that is, changes in real claims
24Because the BIS data are denominated in U.S. dollars and exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar have
been volatile in Latin America, one could be concerned that exchange rate movements are disproportion-
ately affecting the measured behavior of foreign bank claims. However, we believe that this should not be
a serious issue for two main reasons. First, our analysis focuses on international claims, which include
cross-border claims (denominated in any currency) and local claims (that is, those issued by foreign bank
subsidiaries and branches) denominated in foreign currency. Thus, since local claims in local currency are
not included in our study, the concern that some of the foreign claims that we analyze might have origi-
nated in the volatile host country currency is small in our view. This could occur only if some of the cross-
border claims were denominated in the local currency, which seems unlikely. Second, while some of the
cross-border claims could have originated in a home currency other than the dollar, some rough estima-
tions, using data from the BIS Locational Statistics, indicate that for all countries in our sample, the aver-
age share of assets denominated in dollars was close to 80 percent or higher during the sample period we
consider.
25For example, Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1998) find credit ratings to have a positive impact
on portfolio flows to Asia and Latin America. In turn, Hernandez, Mellado, and Valdes (2001) find host
GDP growth to have a similar effect on private capital flows to a larger sample of developing countries.





Host country real 
GDP growth





rating) × exposure 
to host
Host crisis dummy





Home j real GDP growth ×
home country j
Home j real interest rate ×
home country j
%∆(Home local currency j/
US$ exchange rate)
%∆(Private real claims 
on other countries)
Notes: *BIS stands for Bank for International Settlements. **IFS stands for International Finan-
cial Statistics, an International Monetary Fund publication.
Percentage change in claims from home
country j banks on the private sector in
host country i at time t.
Real GDP growth in host country i at time
t − 1 where i stands for Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela, respectively.
Real GDP growth in host i interacted with
home country j banks’exposure to i,
where i stands for Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela
and j refers to Canada, France, Germany,
Japan, Spain, United Kingdom and
United States, respectively.
Percentage change in host country i credit
risk rating, where i is defined above.
Percentage change in host i credit rating
times home country j banks’ exposure
to i, where i and j are defined above.
Dummy equal to 1 when host country i has
a crisis, where i is defined above. See
Table A.1 for a list of crisis episodes.
Dummy equal to 1 when host country i
has a crisis times home country j banks’
exposure to i, where i and j are defined
above.
Percentage change in the dollar exchange
rate vis-à-vis host i’s currency, where i
is defined above.
Home country j real GDP growth
interacted with dummy for home
country j, where j is defined above.
Home country j real interest rate
interacted with dummy for home
country j, where j is defined above.
Percentage change in the dollar exchange
rate vis-à-vis home country j’s currency,
where j is defined above.
Percentage change in home country j bank
claims on countries other than host i,
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from banks in home country j on host country i), and no bilateral relationship is
important enough to warrant such concern. Nonetheless, as a precaution, all right-
hand-side variables are lagged one period (one year).27 Also, to mitigate the con-
cern that changes in foreign bank claims from different home countries might be
driven by the same events or news (for example, on the health of the world econ-
omy), our robustness tests include time dummies to capture such factors.
The impact of host shocks on foreign bank claims might be affected by the
degree to which foreign banks are exposed to that host. On the one hand, the larger
the exposure of foreign banks to a particular country, the more procyclical (that is,
the more responsive to host conditions) foreign claims might become. This might
be due to a lack of diversification. On the other hand, as banks’exposure to a coun-
try grows, banks might have more incentives to learn about host country conditions
and, hence, not to respond as strongly to signals of good or bad future events.28
Alternatively, it could be the case that greater exposure (especially in the case of
brick-and-mortar operations) might signal a stronger commitment to the host,
which also gets translated into a smaller reaction to host shocks.29 Hence, there
are reasons to expect that foreign bank claims might become more stable or less
responsive to host shocks as exposure rises.
To test the impact of exposure on host factors, we interact host country vari-
ables (the change in ratings, the real growth, and the crisis indicator for host coun-
try i) with a measure of foreign banks’ exposure to the country. A priori, if indeed
higher exposure is translated into more stable financing, we expect these interaction
terms to be opposite in sign to that of the host country shock. For example, we
expect the interaction between host growth (or changes in host rating) and exposure
to be negative and the interaction between host crisis and exposure to be positive.
Studies such as Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) have shown that there is
scope for contagion in international banking. In particular, they show that changes
in foreign bank claims on one country might spill over to other countries that hold
claims from the same foreign banks. Furthermore, models of portfolio allocation
show that under standard rules of portfolio choice an unexpected decline in the
value of one or more assets may provoke a portfolio adjustment across the board.30
Because our data aggregate bank positions at the country level, we cannot conduct
a strict test of portfolio effects at the bank level. Nevertheless, we seek to verify
whether at least in the aggregate there is evidence that banks’changes in claims on
other countries affect individual hosts. If this were the case, we would expect to find
that the variable %∆Private Claims on Other Countries is positive and significant.
27We also conducted estimations including all regressors contemporaneously and found that our main
results do not change. These estimations are available upon request.
28Calvo and Mendoza (2000) argue that as investors become more diversified, and hence their aver-
age exposures in any particular asset decrease, they have reduced incentives to learn about the fundamen-
tals of each asset, and hence react more strongly to signals on expected return or risk. This suggests that
as foreign banks become more exposed to a particular host country, they may react less to changes in host
country variables.
29The argument that foreign bank brick-and-mortar presence signals a greater commitment to the host
country is made in Palmer (2000) and Peek and Rosengren (2000).
30Schinasi and Smith (1999) discuss optimal portfolio rebalancing as “contagion” after different types
of shocks to expected asset returns and variances.Home country economic conditions could have a negative or a positive impact
on foreign bank lending to host countries. On the one hand, adverse economic con-
ditions and a lack of profit opportunities at home could encourage banks to hold
claims abroad. If this were the case, we would expect to find a negative coefficient
on home growth. On the other hand, a recession at home could lead to a deteriora-
tion in the capital of foreign banks and an overall retrenchment in claims held at
home and abroad. Therefore, we remain agnostic regarding the sign of this variable.
Low real interest rates in lender countries tend to signal periods of excess li-
quidity, and this might increase banks’willingness to extend riskier, higher interest
rate claims to developing countries. Therefore, we expect home real interest rates
to have a negative impact on the change in claims to countries in Latin America.
To deepen our understanding of the determinants of foreign bank claims under
different circumstances, we estimate some modified versions of equation (1). First,
we examine whether banks’responsiveness to shocks depends on the type of shock
experienced, by allowing the coefficients in equation (1) to vary on the basis of
whether the host country undergoes positive or negative shocks.31 Second, we
explore whether there is evidence that the determinants of foreign bank claims have
changed over time by estimating equation (1) over two subsamples: 1985–94 and
1995–2000.32 In particular, we examine whether banks’ sensitivity to host and
home conditions and to aggregate movements in claims changed over this period.
Finally, to summarize the relative importance of home and host conditions and of
aggregate shocks in claims, we report the percentage of the variance of claims
explained by each of these factors, and we study whether it has changed over time.
To the extent that home country conditions and aggregate shocks in claims consis-
tently dominate host country variables in explaining changes in claims, we would
conclude that foreign banks have the potential to destabilize host countries by trans-
mitting shocks external to these economies.
III. Empirical Results
Starting from a fully unrestricted model where all regressors are allowed to be dif-
ferent depending on the banks’ home country, we tested a number of coefficient
restrictions on equation (1) until we arrived at our baseline specifications reported
in Table 2.33 Home and host dummies and exchange rate changes vis-à-vis the
U.S. dollar are included in these specifications but are not shown owing to space
constraints.
The baseline model accepted in the specification tests reported in the appendix
is one where host factors (growth in host GDP, change in credit ratings, the exchange
31We do not investigate positive/negative home growth shocks, because for the seven home countries
we focus on, there have been virtually no years in which home growth has been negative.
32These two subsamples are selected on the basis of papers such as Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg
(2001) and García (2002) that argue that foreign bank presence in Latin America rose after 1995.
33Essentially, the fully unrestricted model is equivalent to estimating a separate equation for each
lender/home country, including its corresponding home factors, a matrix of host factors, and a variable
capturing changes in claims to other countries. The fully unrestricted model is shown in Table A.2 and the
restriction tests are shown in Table A.3.
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Table 2. The Determinants of the Percentage Change 
in Foreign Bank Claims on Latin America
1985–2000 1985–1994  1995–2000 
Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient 
Variable (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic)
Host country variables
Host country real GDP growth 2.120 2.244 1.157
(2.900)*** (2.990)*** (0.730)
Host country real GDP growth ×− 0.210 −0.242 0.050
exposure to host (2.120)** (2.340)** (0.230)
%∆(Host country rating) 1.142 0.062 2.279
(2.460)** (0.210) (1.960)*
%∆(Host country rating) ×− 0.093 0.029 −0.380
exposure to host (1.490) (0.560) (2.150)**
Host crisis dummy −3.409 −6.855 −0.639
(0.640) (1.190) (0.060)
Host crisis dummy × 0.760 0.013 0.349
exposure to host (0.660) (0.010) (0.180)
Home country variables
Canadian real GDP growth × 8.544 1.942 −6.327
Canada (2.010)** (0.550) (0.290)
French real GDP growth ×− 1.759 −3.501 −1.953
France (0.860) (1.490) (0.380)
German real GDP growth ×− 2.140 −2.822 −22.063
Germany (0.840) (1.050) (1.600)
Japanese real GDP growth × 5.370 −0.809 11.884
Japan (1.670)* (0.250) (2.460)**
Spanish real GDP growth ×− 4.815 −2.185 −4.579
Spain (0.720) (0.300) (0.280)
U.K. real GDP growth × U.K. −2.928 −8.975
(0.180) (0.510)
U.S. real GDP growth × U.S. −5.399 −10.331 −1.623
(2.200)** (3.760)*** (0.190)
Canadian real interest rate ×− 15.551 −7.299 −6.610
Canada (3.520)*** (1.820)* (0.400)
French real interest rate ×− 0.204 −1.631 −11.591
France (0.130) (0.410) (1.650)*
German real interest rate × 0.468 4.859 −7.393
Germany (0.170) (1.230) (0.400)
Japanese real interest rate ×− 11.248 −11.576 −9.544
Japan (2.090)** (1.010) (0.860)
Spanish real interest rate ×− 0.458 1.160 55.259
Spain (0.180) (0.460) (2.660)***
U.K. real interest rate × U.K. 17.733 17.890
(1.070) (0.940)
U.S. real interest rate × U.S. −7.122 −8.053 1.028
(2.740)*** (3.030)*** (0.110)
%∆(Private real claims on  0.146 0.130 0.347
other countries) (3.130)*** (2.200)** (0.680)rate vis-à-vis the dollar, and the crisis dummy) and aggregate changes in claims (on
countries other than the host in question) are constrained to affect foreign bank
claims from all home countries in the same way. On the other hand, these tests sug-
gest that banks from different home countries respond differently to shocks to their
own growth and interest rates. In other words, we cannot impose the restriction that
the coefficients on home growth and real interest rates are the same across banks
from different home countries (see Table A.3). Thus, in the estimations in Table 2,
each home country variable is interacted with the corresponding home country
dummy.
The first column in Table 2 presents the selected restricted model for the whole
sample period, 1985–2000. We find evidence that foreign banks responded to
home, host, and aggregate claims shocks. Focusing on the subset of home country
j variables, we find that banks from France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom,
and the United States reduced claims in response to increased profit opportunities
at home (that is, in response to higher home growth), but only the coefficient on
U.S. growth is significant with a negative sign. Home growth has a positive and sig-
nificant effect for Canadian bank claims. With the exception of banks from
Germany and the United Kingdom, the home real interest rate has the expected neg-
ative impact. This variable is statistically significant for Canada, Japan, and the
United States.34
34The finding that only some of the home variables are significant might arise from the fact that these
variables tend to be significantly correlated within and across home countries.
Table 2. (Concluded)
1985–2000 1985–1994  1995–2000 
Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient 
Variable (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic)
Number of observations 804 426 378
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.10 0.19
F-test for significance of the  5.59*** 5.56*** 3.84***
overall regression
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table reports the estimates from a selected (restricted) version of equation (1),
according to the F-tests reported in Table A.3. The model assumes that banks’reactions to host con-
ditions is the same across home countries, but that their response to their home conditions is differ-
ent across home country, hence each home country variable is interacted with a home country
dummy. The model estimated is equivalent to estimating a separate equation for each type of bank
(that is Canadian, French, German, Japanese, Spanish, U.K. and U.S. banks) where the coefficients
on the host variables are constrained to be the same across equations (that is, across home countries).
The United Kingdom is omitted for the period 1985–1994, because data on private sector claims are
not available prior to 1993. Home dummies and home and host exchange rate changes are included
but not shown. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Among the subset of host country variables, we find that the coefficient on
host growth is positive and significant, showing that foreign banks responded to
host country growth, increasing and decreasing claims over the cycle. However,
we also find strong support for the notion that claims’ procyclicality (that is, sen-
sitivity to host growth) falls as foreign banks’ exposure to the host rises. The co-
efficient on host credit rating is positive and significant, while the interaction term
of rating with exposure is negative but not significant. Controlling for host coun-
try growth and risk ratings, the crisis variable is not significant. Therefore, it does
not appear that crisis episodes cause any further decline in foreign bank claims.35
Finally, the coefficient on changes in private claims on other countries is positive
and significant, indicating that aggregate changes in foreign bank claims spill over
to individual hosts.
Between 1995 and 2000, foreign bank penetration in Latin America—the par-
ticipation of foreign banks in the local banking market—increased significantly. In
1995, foreign bank loans (in local and foreign currency) represented approximately
15 percent of total bank loans to the region. By 2000 this figure rose to 38 percent.36
Some have speculated that an increase in foreign banks’ brick-and-mortar opera-
tions in developing countries could signal a stronger commitment to their hosts,
since this type of presence makes it both physically and reputationally harder for
foreign banks to “run” in the face of adversity at home, in the host country, or else-
where in their portfolio (see Palmer, 2000; and Peek and Rosengren, 2000).
Ideally, to investigate whether the responsiveness of foreign banks to shocks
changed as their brick-and-mortar investment (or local claims) in these countries
increased, we would want to control for the ratio of local foreign bank claims to
total claims (that is, claims extended through brick-and-mortar operations as a
share of overall foreign bank claims). However, since such data are not consistently
available, we are able to examine this issue only indirectly, by comparing the esti-
mates of our model over two subsamples: 1985–94, when foreign participation was
in general low and in some instances prohibited, and 1995–2000, when foreign
bank presence took off.37,38 Because this is a very indirect way of exploring this
35This result is robust including both the crisis dummy as well as other regressors contemporaneously
rather than lagged. Also, the result holds if we separately control for banking, currency, and twin crises.
36These figures, which include the share of loans held by all foreign banks operating in all of Latin
America, come from Salomon Smith Barney (2000).
37BIS statistics lump together local claims in foreign currency with cross-border claims; therefore, it
is not possible to calculate the importance of brick-and-mortar operations (that is, the sum of all local
claims, in foreign and domestic currency) as a share of total foreign bank claims. Another problem is that
local claims in local currency statistics are not broken down by sector (private, public, and so forth). One
could in principle construct a series of foreign bank local claims on each Latin American host by aggre-
gating balance sheet data for individual banks from Bankscope or from bank superintendencies in the
host countries. The problem with combining this data with the BIS data is that while the latter nets out
interoffice positions (the positions of foreign bank offices worldwide), the balance sheet data mentioned
above would not. Furthermore, banks’ balance sheet information for the period 1985–2000 is generally
not available.
38We separate the sample in the period before and after 1995, following Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg
(2001) and García (2002), who argue that the increase in foreign bank presence in Latin America occurred
after this year.issue, we need to be cautious in interpreting our results, especially given that many
other factors aside from the share of brick-and-mortar presence may have changed
in the region over the period 1985–2000. Also, caution is warranted considering
that the period of analysis is relatively short. Nevertheless, because the question is
an interesting one, we present these estimations to illustrate some of the potential
issues that will have to be verified by future research.
For the period 1985–1994, we find that host real growth played a significant
role in explaining movements in real claims (see Table 2). The coefficient on the
dummy variable capturing crises in the host countries is negative but not signifi-
cant. Home factors appear to be significant only for Canada and the United States.
Finally, the coefficient on the change in real claims on other countries is both pos-
itive and significant, indicating that changes in claims on other countries affected
specific hosts.
For the period 1995–2000, we find that in contrast to the results for the earlier
period, there is no significant evidence that changes in claims elsewhere were trans-
mitted to the host countries we focus on. Home factors continued to be significant,
but only for Spain and Japan. As for the host factors, there is no evidence that for-
eign banks retrenched at times of crises during this period either. On the other hand,
changes in credit ratings had a positive and significant impact on foreign bank lend-
ing. However, foreign banks’responsiveness to this variable seems to decrease with
exposure.
All in all, the findings from splitting the sample into the periods pre- and post-
1995 suggest that in recent years foreign banks have become less inclined to cut
and run when faced with adversity in the region or abroad. Whether this is the result
of the late 1990s increase in foreign bank brick-and-mortar presence will have to
be examined more thoroughly and directly in future research.
Not only is it possible that foreign bank behavior changes as their brick-and-
mortar presence increases, but it is also feasible that their reaction to shocks depends
asymmetrically on the nature of these events. To examine this possibility, we dis-
criminate between positive and negative changes in host GDP growth, host credit
ratings, and in other claims. Table 3 presents the results from this estimation for the
overall sample, 1985–2000.39 We find that while positive changes in host real GDP
growth have a positive and significant sign, the coefficient on negative host GDP
growth is negative but not significant. The same is true for credit ratings: claims
respond to upgrades and not to downgrades in credit ratings. However, the higher
the exposure to a host country, the smaller the response of claims to upgrades in
credit ratings, as indicated by the significant and negative coefficient on the inter-
action term between upgrades and exposure. On the other hand, both positive and
negative changes in aggregate claims on other countries are statistically significant,
but negative changes have a much stronger impact, and that difference is statisti-
cally significant at standard significance levels.
39Note that we define negative changes in absolute terms so that we can interpret a negative coeffi-
cient as indicating that larger drops in the variable in question lead to a decline in the growth of claims.
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Table 3. The Impact of Positive and Negative Shocks on the 
Change in Foreign Bank Claims on Latin America
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
Host country variables
Positive host real GDP growth 1.679 (1.68)*
Negative host real GDP growth −2.179 (1.59)
Positive host real GDP growth × exposure to host −0.016 (0.13)
Negative host real GDP growth × exposure to host 0.358 (1.46)
Host country rating upgrade 1.665 (1.88)*
Host country rating downgrade −0.036 (0.06)
Host country rating upgrade × exposure to host −0.245 (2.53)**
Host country rating downgrade × exposure to host −0.117 (2.11)**
Host crisis dummy −5.385 (0.92)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host 1.100 (0.87)
Home country variables
Increase in private real claims on other countries 0.133 (2.79)***
Decrease in private real claims on other countries −0.922 (1.99)**
Canadian real GDP growth × Canada 8.894 (2.04)**
French real GDP growth × France −2.291 (1.09)
German real GDP growth × Germany −2.140 (0.86)
Japanese real GDP growth × Japan 5.483 (1.69)*
Spanish real GDP growth × Spain −5.889 (0.87)
U.K. real GDP growth × U.K. −1.136 (0.07)
U.S. real GDP growth × U.S. −4.618 (1.87)*
Canadian real interest rate × Canada −14.433 (3.14)***
French real interest rate × France −0.118 (0.07)
German real interest rate × Germany −0.333 (0.12)
Japanese real interest rate × Japan −13.031 (2.43)**
Spanish real interest rate × Spain −0.110 (0.04)
U.K. real interest rate × U.K. 21.010 (1.20)
U.S. real interest rate × U.S. −5.372 (1.77)*
Number of observations 804
Adjusted R-squared 0.13
F-test for significance of the overall regression 6.15
Prob > F 0.00
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table presents the results from a model where the impact of host GDP changes, rat-
ing changes, and changes in other claims is allowed to vary depending on the positive or negative
nature of the shocks. The period of estimation is 1985–2000. Home dummies and host and home
exchange rate changes are included, but not shown. Growth rates and changes in ratings and claims
are expressed in terms of absolute values. *, **, ***denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent,
respectively. t-statistics are obtained on the basis of robust standard errors. 
A useful way of summarizing the relative importance of home, host, and aggre-
gate claim shocks is provided in Table 4, which details the percentage of the vari-
ance in private sector claims explained by each of these groups of variables. In
other words, for each group of variables, we compute the increase in the R-squared,as a proportion of the total variance of the percentage change in claims explained
by all variables.40,41
We find that while changes in aggregate claims on other countries explain a sig-
nificant share of the variance in the dependent variable (21 percent) in the
1985–1994 period, this variable plays practically no role in explaining changes in
private sector claims on host countries in Latin America during the later period.
Similarly, home country conditions explain a large proportion (62 percent) of the
variance in private claims in the period 1985–1994, but their importance declines
significantly in the late 1990s. On the other hand, host country conditions explain
between 20 and 50 percent of the variance in claims in both periods, and, over-
whelmingly, it is positive changes (positive growth and credit rating upgrades) that
play the most significant role in explaining changes in international financial
claims. These patterns are observed comparing two periods over which the brick-
and-mortar operations of foreign banks increased significantly in importance. Once
again, whether the increase in brick-and-mortar presence is responsible for these
patterns will have to be established more conclusively by future research.
40We rescale the percentage explained by each group of variables so that the sum of all three is 100.
41The R-squared statistics for these regressions appear to be low, yet they are in line with those
obtained in other studies on foreign bank lending flows also using BIS data, as well as in studies that exam-
ine capital flows in general. See, for example, Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1998); Goldberg (2002);
and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003).
Table 4. Percentage of Variance of Change in Foreign Bank Claims
Explained by Home, Host, and Portfolio Shocks
Home Country  Host Country  %∆Private Real Claims 
Variables Variables on Other Countries
Entire sample 46.78 31.41 21.81
Positive changes 59.451 28.43 6.39
Negative changes 1.69 4.03
1985–1994 61.63 17.76 20.61
1995–2000 49.56 48.59 1.85
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table reports the percentage of the variance of the change in foreign bank claims that
can be explained by home, host, and portfolio shocks. The percent variance explained is calculated
as (R2_full–R2_constrained)/R2_full *100. The home country variables included are real GDP growth, real
interest rates, and the home/dollar exchange rate. Host country variables included are: real GDP
growth, credit rating, the host/dollar exchange rate, and the crisis dummy. Positive changes refer to
credit rating upgrades, host positive real GDP growth, and increases in other claims. Negative
changes refer to credit rating downgrades, negative real host GDP growth, and decreases in other
claims. We rescale the percent of the variance explained by each set of variables so that for a given
estimation the sum of all three groups adds to 100. 
1We are unable to split home variables into positive and negative shocks, since between 1985–2000
there are no periods when home variables take negative values. So, essentially the negative/
positive estimation corresponds to one where host variables and other claims, but not the home vari-
ables, are split into positive and negative changes (see Table 3).
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Robustness Checks
We conduct a number of additional estimations to verify the robustness of our main
findings. First, we include time dummies to control for the impact of events that can
simultaneously affect all home countries (for example, good and bad news about
the world economy and crises outside Latin America). Second, we explore whether
changes in foreign bank claims to Latin America are driven by the recent wave of
mergers and acquisitions of domestic banks by foreign banks. Since the BIS defi-
nition of claims includes not only loans but also equity participations, we are inter-
ested in determining whether changes in foreign claims are driven by bank
consolidation, as opposed to new lending. Finally, we use alternative definitions of
exposure and of aggregate changes in claims that take into account the fact that
banks do not only hold claims on the nonbank private sector but also extend claims
to the public sector and to other financial institutions in the host countries.
The first three columns of Table 5 repeat the baseline specifications in Table 2,
including yearly time dummies. With time dummies, we find that host GDP growth
continues to be strongly significant for the overall period and the period 1985–
1994. On the other hand, the credit rating is significant at only 10 percent now. As
before, Canadian and U.S. home factors drive claims on Latin America. Also, we
continue to find no support for the argument that foreign banks are likely to cut and
run during crises. Finally, changes in claims on other countries are less significant
than when the time dummies are excluded.
The last three columns of Table 5 include a dummy to control for recent
episodes of mergers and acquisitions between foreign and domestic financial insti-
tutions in our sample of countries.42 This dummy variable takes the value of 1 for
each annual bilateral observation, where there was a purchase of a host country
bank by a foreign bank from one of the seven home countries (there are 89 such
cases out of our total 804 observations). We find that the coefficient on this dummy
is positive but not significant. Most importantly, including this variable does not
change our main results.
Finally, Table 6 presents the results for our preferred specification, but with a
modified definition of exposure and of aggregate changes in claims. So far, expo-
sure was defined as claims from banks from home j to the nonbank private sector
in host i as a ratio of all nonbank private sector claims held by banks from home j.
This definition of exposure was driven by the fact that we wanted to focus exclu-
sively on the determinants of the behavior of private sector claims, since claims on
the public sector might not always respond purely to risk-return factors. However,
this measure of exposure does not reflect the fact that in reality foreign banks lend
to the public and banking sectors as well, and that these claims are part of the banks’
overall exposure and may affect private sector claims. Therefore, we also report esti-
mations considering private sector claims from banks in home j to host i as a ratio
of all international financial claims from banks from home j, regardless of the
42Information on all acquisitions by banks from each of the home countries considered in our study in
our 10 host countries (sale or merger of an entity in host country i to an entity from home country j in year
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 Table 6. The Determinants of the Change in Foreign Bank Claims 
with a Modified Definition of Total Claims
1985–2000 1985–1994 1995–2000 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Variable (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Host country variables
Host real GDP growth 1.975 1.888 1.292
(2.73) (2.59)*** (0.79)
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host −0.243 −0.205 −0.0001
(2.28)** (1.84)* (0.00)
%∆(Host country rating) 0.843 −0.301 2.247
(1.85)* (0.99) (1.97)**
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host −0.029 0.102 −0.402
(0.48) (2.53)** (2.07)**
Host crisis dummy −3.124 −11.075 1.934
(0.58) (1.87)* (0.19)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host 0.127 0.789 −0.540
(0.16) (0.86) (0.40)
Home country variables
Canadian real GDP growth × Canada 8.003 1.837 0.596
(1.93)* (0.50) (0.02)
French real GDP growth × France −1.626 −3.671 1.349
(0.75) (1.51) (0.22)
German real GDP growth × Germany −1.488 −3.203 −18.246
(0.59) (1.22) (1.42)
Japanese real GDP growth × Japan 4.492 −4.028 10.481
(1.42) (1.41) (2.06)**
Spanish real GDP growth × Spain −2.827 0.736 −4.983
(0.43) (0.10) (0.30)
U.K. real GDP growth × U.K. −5.024 −6.662
(0.29) (0.38)
U.S. real GDP growth × U.S. −7.577 −11.256 −2.103
(2.82)*** (3.88)*** (0.23)
Canadian real interest rate × Canada −14.799 −6.680 −12.221
(3.64)*** (1.61) (0.63)
French real interest rate × France 0.190 −0.829 −10.463
(0.11) (0.21) (1.49)
German real interest rate × Germany −1.560 4.865 −3.686
(0.58) (1.20) (0.20)
Japanese real interest rate × Japan −9.170 −1.469 −8.697
(1.86)* (0.16) (0.80)
Spanish real interest rate × Spain 0.069 1.007 50.504
(0.03) (0.39) (2.27)**
U.K. real interest rate × U.K. −6.406 −11.914 18.746
(0.37) (1.58) (1.05)
U.S. real interest rate × U.S. −5.378 −6.337 1.768
(1.77)* (2.01)** (0.18)
%∆(Total claims on other countries) 0.529 0.551 0.456
(1.83)* (1.28) (0.73)
Observations 810 435 375
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.14 0.26
F-test significance of the overall regression 5.20 5.00 3.61
Prob > F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table reports the estimates from the selected model according to the F-tests reported
in Table A.3. Exposure and other claims are defined not in terms of claims to the private sector, but
rather include total (private + public) claims. t-statistics are in parentheses (calculated on the basis of
robust standard errors). *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Andrew Powell, and Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar
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sector. Similarly, we replace our measure of aggregate claim shocks (%∆Private
Claims on Other Countries) for one that considers all international financial claims
rather than only those to the private sector (%∆Total Claims on Other Countries).
As Table 6 shows, our main results are not driven by our definition of exposure or
of aggregate changes in claims. Including the revised definition for these variables
that considers all claims (public and private) does not alter our main findings in
Table 2.
IV. Conclusions
As the trend toward greater international financial integration persists, the debate
on the behavior of foreign banks is likely to continue. In this paper, we employed
a comprehensive data set to explore the behavior of foreign bank claims to Latin
America, a region that witnessed a significant increase in foreign bank financing
during the 1990s. Our data set is rich in two dimensions. From a cross-sectional
perspective, we captured the behavior of banks from a number of home countries
that differ both in their degree of exposure and in their importance as a source of
finance to Latin America. From a time-series perspective, our data set allowed us
to focus on periods of tranquility as well as on periods of crises, on periods of low
foreign bank penetration and on periods of strong brick-and-mortar presence.
Nevertheless, the data used in this paper have limitations. First, the data are
aggregated at the country level. Lack of individual bank-level data precludes us
from formally testing portfolio-balancing effects, among other things. Second, be-
cause we lack separate data on local and cross-border claims, we cannot test the
impact of the increase in foreign bank brick-and-mortar presence on the behavior
of foreign bank claims directly. Finally, the time period considered, though longer
than in some of the previous studies, is still relatively short.
While this paper cannot answer all questions related to the behavior of foreign
banks, it contributes to this debate by highlighting some of the consequences of
relying on foreign bank financing and allowing foreign bank entry in developing
countries. We found that “banking with foreigners” has the potential of making
developing countries vulnerable to home country shocks. We also found that move-
ments in claims to other countries may spill over to individual host countries. The
good news, though, is that the importance of these external shocks appears to have
declined in recent years.
Regarding the impact of host shocks, we found that while foreign banks respond
to host conditions, they do not appear to pull out faster at times of crises or during
other periods of economic downturn. Furthermore, higher foreign bank exposure
appears to be a stabilizing force, since we found that foreign banks’responsiveness
to host conditions becomes less procyclical as exposure increases.
Our results suggest a number of policy implications that will need to be con-
firmed with further research. First, though further analysis would be required to
establish a clear causal relation, it appears that favoring brick-and-mortar presence
over cross-border lending might be a sensible policy to limit the scope for external
shocks that may result from relying on foreign bank financing. Second, regarding
the issue of claims’ procyclicality, our results suggest that countries dependent onforeign bank financing might benefit more from dealing with a small number of
foreign banks with high exposures than with a large number of banks with low
exposure and no commitment to the country. Finally, our finding that foreign bank
claims do not retrench during crises is consistent with the view that foreign bank
financing and entry should be promoted on the basis that it can be have a stabiliz-
ing influence on credit growth during crisis periods and in their aftermath.
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.Table A.2. Unrestricted Model of the Determinants of the Change 
in Foreign Bank Claims on Latin America
Variable Coeff. t-Statistic
Host country variables
Host real GDP growth × Canada 0.561 (0.14)
Host real GDP growth × France 0.760 (0.84)
Host real GDP growth × Germany 1.101 (0.72)
Host real GDP growth × Japan 2.316 (2.00)**
Host real GDP growth × Spain 4.203 (1.93)*
Host real GDP growth × U.K. 3.435 (0.76)
Host real GDP growth × U.S. 2.414 (2.61)***
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host × Canada −0.011 (0.02)
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host × France −0.199 (0.88)
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host × Germany −0.112 (0.62)
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host × Japan −4.349 (2.43)**
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host × Spain −0.285 (1.22)
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host × U.K. −0.599 (0.24)
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host × U.S. −0.160 (1.16)
%∆(Host country rating) × Canada 2.852 (1.20)
%∆(Host country rating) × France −0.779 (2.39)**
%∆(Host country rating) × Germany 0.170 (0.35)
%∆(Host country rating) × Japan 1.537 (2.27)**
%∆(Host country rating) × Spain 1.207 (1.12)
%∆(Host country rating) × U.K. 0.919 (0.37)
%∆(Host country rating) × U.S. 1.735 (3.35)***
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host × Canada −0.313 (1.16)
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host × France 0.224 (2.54)**
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host × Germany −0.009 (0.13)
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host × Japan −0.127 (0.17)
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host × Spain −0.172 (1.18)
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host × U.K. −0.983 (0.61)
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host × U.S. −0.050 (0.82)
Host crisis dummy × Canada 9.459 (0.48)
Host crisis dummy × France −6.435 (0.92)
Host crisis dummy × Germany −6.303 (0.72)
Host crisis dummy × Japan 5.304 (0.26)
Host crisis dummy × Spain 16.369 (0.79)
Host crisis dummy × U.K. −38.074 (0.75)
Host crisis dummy × U.S. −15.390 (1.53)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host × Canada 2.375 (0.53)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host × France −1.605 (0.73)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host × Germany −0.469 (0.36)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host × Japan −4.761 (0.19)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host × Spain 0.017 (0.00)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host × U.K. 12.441 (0.35)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host × U.S. 1.152 (0.82)
Home country variables
Canadian real GDP growth × Canada 3.358 (0.67)
French real GDP growth × France −4.572 (2.43)**
(continued)
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German real GDP growth × Germany −3.492 (1.31)
Japanese real GDP growth × Japan 5.725 (1.87)*
Spanish real GDP growth × Spain −3.618 (0.65)
U.K. real GDP growth × U.K. −17.058 (1.32)
U.S. real GDP growth × U.S. −5.564 (2.08)**
Canadian real interest rate × Canada −0.167 (0.03)
French real interest rate × France −0.188 (0.10)
German real interest rate × Germany 2.640 (0.85)
Japanese real interest rate × Japan −12.073 (2.16)**
Spanish real interest rate × Spain −1.263 (0.44)
U.K. real interest rate × U.K. −16.455 (0.64)
U.S. real interest rate × U.S. −0.679 (0.19)
%∆(Private real claims on other countries) × Canada × Canada 1.632 (1.95)*
%∆(Private real claims on other countries) × France −0.011 (0.03)
%∆(Private real claims on other countries) × Germany 0.501 (1.46)
%∆(Private real claims on other countries) × Japan 0.132 (2.29)**
%∆(Private real claims on other countries) × Spain −0.214 (0.68)
%∆(Private real claims on other countries) × U.K. 2.048 (1.43)
%∆(Private real claims on other countries) × U.S. 0.583 (2.41)**
Number of observations 804
Adjusted R-squared 0.11
F-test significance of the overall regression 2.59
Prob > F 0.00
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating equation (1) for the change in private sector
claims. The model estimated is equivalent to estimating a separate equation for each home/lender
country where home and host countries are allowed to have a different coefficient for each home or
lender country. Home and host exchange rate changes and home and host dummies are included but
not shown. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. t-statistics are calcu-
lated on the basis of robust standard errors. Table A.3. F-tests for Coefficient Restrictions Across Home Countries
F-test of 
Unrestricted Coefficient 
Restricted Coefficients Coefficients Restrictions
Model A3.1
Host real GDP growth Home real GDP growth F(96,658) = 1.14
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host Home real interest rate Prob > F = 0.1785
%∆(Host local currency/US$ exchange rate) %∆(Home local currency/
%∆(Host rating) US$ exchange rate)
%∆(Host rating) × exposure to host %∆(Private real claims 
Host crisis dummy on all other countries)
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host Home dummies
Host dummies
Model A3.2
Host real GDP growth Home real GDP growth F(101,658) = 1.10
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host Home real interest rate Prob > F = 0.2559
%∆(Host local currency/US$ exchange rate) %∆(Private real claims 
%∆(Host country rating) on all other countries)
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host Home dummies
Host crisis dummy
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host
Host dummies
%∆(Home local currency/US$ exchange rate)
Model A3.3
Host real GDP growth Home real GDP growth F(107,658) = 1.14
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host Home real interest rate Prob > F = 0.1793
%∆(Host local currency/US$ exchange rate) Home dummies
%∆(Host country rating)
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host
Host crisis dummy
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host
Host dummies
%∆(Home local currency/US$ exchange rate)
%∆(Private real claims on all other countries)
Model A3.4
Host real GDP growth Home real GDP growth F(112,658) = 1.20
Host real GDP growth × exposure to host Home dummies Prob > F = 0.0916*
%∆(Host local currency/US$ exchange rate)
%∆(Host country rating)
%∆(Host country rating) × exposure to host
Host crisis dummy
Host crisis dummy × exposure to host
Host dummies
%∆(Home local currency/US$ exchange rate)
%∆(Private real claims on all other countries)
Home real interest rate
Notes: This table presents the results from estimating a number of tests on equation (1), where
we constrain coefficients across home countries. Starting from the specification reported in Table A.2
we present a series of tests in which we try constraining several combinations of coefficients. 
* denotes significance at 10 percent. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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